This paper re-examines the evidence on open market share repurchase activity reported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) for the United Kingdom. Using data from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), Rau and Vermaelen conclude that the level of repurchase activity is trivial. They attribute the low repurchase volume to regulatory restrictions that limit companies' ability to take advantage of an undervalued stock price and conclude that the bulk of repurchase activity that does occur is driven by the desire to generate tax credits for pension funds. Using data collected from a variety of sources, we find that the SDC understates open market buyback activity in the United Kingdom by as much as eighty percent. Based on our more comprehensive dataset we find that (a) pension funds are not the primary cause of U.K. share repurchases and (b) despite the prevailing regulatory environment, underpricing still represents an important driver of repurchase activity.
I. Introduction
Following extensive research in the United States, a growing interest in share repurchases in other jurisdictions is starting to emerge as a means of developing a more complete understanding of their incidence, rationale and shareholder wealth effects. In an original contribution to the literature, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) (e.g., Dittmar 2000; Stephens and Weisbach 1998; Ikenberry et al. 1995; Comment and Jarrell 1991; Vermaelen 1981) and Canadian (e.g., Ikenberry et al. 2000) studies and are attributed to important differences in the way repurchases are taxed and regulated in the United Kingdom. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine Rau and Vermaelen's key findings and conclusions using more a comprehensive dataset on share repurchase activity. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) (hereinafter RV) conclude that the level of open market repurchase activity in the United Kingdom appears tiny in comparison to that reported for the United States. They hypothesise that this low repurchase volume is attributable to regulatory restrictions that reduce the opportunity for firms to use open market buybacks to take advantage of an undervalued share price. Consistent with a less pronounced underpricing effect, they find that the average stock market reaction to repurchase announcements in the United Kingdom, while positive, is less than half the level reported by comparable U.S. studies. Further, in contrast to the results reported by Ikenberry et al. (1995) for the United States, RV find no evidence that U.K. repurchase announcements are either preceded by significant negative excess returns or followed by significant positive excess returns. With the regulatory environment in the United Kingdom apparently denying companies the chance to exploit underpricing opportunities, RV's results suggest that the majority of repurchase activity is tax driven. In particular, they document that the volume of repurchase completions peaked between September 1994 and October 1996 when a loophole in the tax code allowed pension funds to earn tax credits on share repurchases. In addition, the one-year postannouncement excess returns are significantly lower during this period, supporting the view that these transactions were less likely to have been motivated by underpricing considerations.
While the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) represents an established source of data on repurchase announcements made by U.S. firms, less is known about the extent to which it accurately captures share buyback activity in the United Kingdom. We collect reported by more than one hundred percent and the value of actual share reacquisitions by almost four hundred percent. We therefore conclude that data obtained from the SDC provides an incomplete measure of the volume and value of share buybacks in the United Kingdom and that reliance on this data source may explain the apparent lack of share repurchase activity documented by RV.
After establishing that buyback activity in the United Kingdom is substantially higher than the levels reported by RV, we re-examine their conclusions regarding the impact of taxes and regulation. We find that RV's results concerning the impact of taxes appear to reflect sampling biases in the SDC data: while we are able to replicate the peak in open market repurchase completions between September 1994 and October 1996 using our SDC sample, this peak is not apparent when we use a more complete dataset of repurchase activity. Similarly, while RV's finding of lower long-horizon postannouncement abnormal returns is replicated using our SDC sample, the effect is no longer evident when the expanded dataset is used. In sum, the results obtained using our more comprehensive dataset do not support claims that share repurchase activity in the United Kingdom has been primarily driven by the desire to generate tax credits for pension funds.
Our evidence on the question of whether regulatory restrictions limit the opportunity for U.K. firms to use repurchases to exploit perceived underpricing, while robust to the particular dataset used, also differs markedly from that reported by RV. We report statistically significant negative (positive) excess returns measured over the oneyear period prior (subsequent) to the repurchase announcement for both our SDC and expanded samples. These findings are consistent with Ikenberry et al. (1995) and suggest that as in the United States, share repurchases in the United Kingdom are partly a response to undervaluation. Our short-window market reaction tests also support this conclusion: average abnormal returns measured over the 11-day window centred on the announcement day range between two and three per cent and as such appear consistent with the levels reported by extant U.S. studies. Finally, using data on actual share reacquisitions collected from firms' published financial statements, we document evidence of strategic trading activity similar to that reported by Ikenberry et al. (2000) for Canada: as prices fall, managers appear to respond by buying more shares. Viewed collectively, our findings suggest that in spite of regulations that discourage open market share repurchases aimed at taking advantage of an undervalued stock price, underpricing still represents an important driver of share reacquisitions in the United Kingdom.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly reviews the U.K. regulatory and tax framework with respect to share repurchases and summarizes RV's main conclusions. Section III describes our data sources and sampling methods, and reports descriptive statistics on open market repurchase announcements and actual reacquisition activity. Section IV reports our replication of RV's primary tests using data from both the SDC and alternative sources. Section V provides additional evidence on the association between actual share reacquisitions and underpricing. Section VI presents a summary and conclusions.
II. Open Market Share Repurchases, Underpricing and Taxation
In the United Kingdom, share repurchases are regulated by a combination of the Companies Act 1981 and the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
Motivated by concerns that open market repurchases (where the vendor is unaware that she is selling to the company) could provide firms with the opportunity to engage in insider trading by buying back shares only when they are underpriced, the LSE restricts the timing of buybacks. Under the LSE's Model Code, firms are prohibited from repurchasing their shares during periods when information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is most acute. These non-trading windows, known as "close periods", are defined as the period of two months immediately preceding the preliminary announcement of the company's annual (or interim) results or, if shorter, the period from the relevant financial year end up to and including the date of the announcement. As an additional safeguard for uninformed investors, firms executing share reacquisitions in the open market are also required to disclose details of the transaction to the LSE by 8.30am
on the day following the buyback. As a result of these regulations, RV predict that U.K.
companies find it more difficult than their U.S. counterparts to use repurchases to exploit perceived undervaluation. Accordingly, to the extent that the positive market reaction to buyback announcements documented in the United States reflects the belief that firms repurchase their shares to take advantage of perceived underpricing, RV predict that buyback announcements in the United Kingdom will be characterized by lower announcement-period returns. Similarly, they also argue that the negative (positive) longrun preannouncement (postannouncement) excess returns that are indicative of underpricing (Ikenberry et al. 2000 and 1995; Weisbach and Stephens 1998) will be less apparent in the United Kingdom. Consistent with these predictions, RV report 11-day announcement-period excess returns of only 1.14% (compared to the three per cent documented for the United States) and find no evidence that announcements are preceded by negative excess returns or followed by positive excess returns.
In the absence of strong undervaluation motives, RV predict that repurchase activity in the United Kingdom is primarily driven by the tax considerations of pension funds. In particular, they highlight that for a large part of their sample period, open market share buybacks were less attractive than dividends to tax exempt investors such as pension funds because the latter generated tax credits whereas the former normally did returns by themselves do not provide prima facie evidence that the regulatory system prevents firms from using repurchases to take advantage of an undervalued stock price.
By way of example, Ikenberry et al. (2000) report average one-month excess returns of only 0.93% for their sample of Canadian repurchase announcements and yet still conclude that "…undervaluation appears to be just as important a consideration for repurchasing shares in Canada as earlier findings suggest for the United States" (Ikenberry et al. 2000 (Ikenberry et al. : 2375 .
Finally, while prior research highlights underpricing as a key factor explaining why firms implement open market share repurchase programs (Dittmar 2000; Stephens and Weisbach 1998; Comment and Jarrell 1991; Vermaelen 1981 ), a range of other important determinants have also been identified. These include distributing excess cash (Dittmar 2000; Fenn and Liang 2000) , improving capital structure efficiency (Dittmar 2000) and fending-off hostile takeovers (Dittmar 2000; Bagwell 1991) . Thus, to conclude that in the absence of an underpricing rationale, share repurchase activity must be driven primarily by external factors (i.e., the tax position of pension funds), rather than by these alternative internal considerations, seems premature.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The literature on share repurchases can be classified according to two distinct methodologies: studies examining the market reaction to the announcement of intentions to implement a repurchase program (e.g., Barth and Kasznik 1999; Comment and Jarrell 1991; Dann 1981; Vermaelen 1981) and studies examining the volume of shares actually reacquired (Dittmar 2000; Fenn and Liang 2000; Ikenberry et al. 2000; Stephens and Weisbach 1998) . Prior research suggests that studies relying solely on share repurchase announcements may generate noisy tests of actual buyback activity. 5 Accordingly, we study both announcements of share repurchase programs and the volume of shares actually reacquired during a given fiscal year.
A. Announcements of Open Market Share Repurchases
We begin by obtaining data on open market repurchase announcements from the SDC database (now supplied by Thompson Financial) subject to the following criteria:
The firm is domiciled in the United Kingdom and had a LSE listing at the time of the announcement.
The firm is not a closed-end investment trust. Regulatory News Service (supplied via Sequencer database) and The Financial Times (hereinafter FT). A search of both databases for the period January 1995 to December 2000 using the keywords "buyback", "buy back", "repurchase", "cancellation" and combinations thereof generated an initial set of 4,549 announcements. This initial sample was then screened to remove:
• Announcements by non-UK-domiciled firms, non-listed firms and closed-end investment trusts.
• Transactions where the repurchase method was not an open market buyback (e.g., off-market repurchases, self-tender offers, special dividends with share consolidations, etc.).
• Going private transactions and announcements of debt or non-equity repurchases.
• Duplicate and stale announcements, announcements that a buyback has been cancelled and analyst comment on, or market speculation about, a repurchase program.
The final sample (hereinafter denoted "Sequencer / FT") consists of 1,614 open market repurchase announcements, 268 of which refer to repurchase intentions and 1,346 refer to actual repurchase events. Panel B of table 1 provides further details of the sample screening process. The much larger number of announcements in this sample compared to that in the SDC sample is a striking feature of the data.
B. Actual Open Market Share Reacquisitions
Comparing announcements of executed repurchases with aggregate repurchase statistics reported in firms' published financial statements reveals that announcements of actual share reacquisitions reported by the SDC, Sequencer and FT significantly understate total repurchase activity. 9 We therefore supplement our announcement samples with actual reacquisition data taken directly from firms' published financial statements. U.K. firms are required to report the aggregate number and total cost of shares repurchased during the year in their published financial statements. 
C. Reconciliation of Announcement Samples
The total number of events in the SDC sample is less than 12% of the 1,631
announcements reported in the Sequencer and FT databases, indicating that the SDC captures only a small proportion of U.K. share repurchase announcements. This is particularly apparent for execution announcements: the 68 executions reported by the financial press and the low volume and value of repurchase activity reported by RV. It also helps to shed light on the "…puzzle… why repurchase activity [in the U.K.] is so tiny compared with the same activity in the U.S." (RV: 267).
D. Descriptive Statistics for Actual Open Market Share Reacquisitions

IV. Replication of Rau and Vermaelen (2002)
The results reported in the preceding section suggest that (a) the SDC represents Kingdom were primarily motivated by a desire to generate tax credits for pension funds.
B. Short-Term Market Reaction to Open Market Repurchase Announcements
RV ( 14 When announcements are split between the pre-October 1996 (agency buyback) and the post-October 1996 (on-market buyback) periods, the CARs are significant for the latter period only. However, the difference between the pre-and post-October 1996
CARs is not statistically significant at conventional levels, indicating that the market reaction to repurchase announcements across these two tax regimes is similar. These results, which mirror those reported by RV, provide little support for the view that repurchases announced during the agency buyback period were perceived as being less value-creating. Neither do they provide compelling evidence that share repurchase intentions announced prior to October 1996 were motivated solely by the desire to generate tax credits for pension funds.
C. Long Run Excess Returns Following the Announcement of Open Market Share
Repurchases RV examine the long-horizon abnormal performance of repurchase announcers relative to a size-and price-to-book benchmark portfolio. In contrast to extant U.S.
findings (e.g., Ikenberry et al. 1995) , they find no evidence that repurchase announcements in the United Kingdom are followed by significant positive excess returns (table 10: 278). Indeed, they present evidence of significantly negative twelve-month postannouncement returns, the main driver of which appears to be announcements made during the agency buyback period. The absence of significant positive postannouncement excess returns is interpreted as evidence that U.K. buybacks are not generally initiated in response to underpricing concerns, while the significantly lower excess returns reported for announcements made during the agency buyback period support the view that these transactions were primarily driven by tax (rather than underpricing) considerations. RV also report that in contrast to the U.S., buyback announcements in the U.K. do not appear to be preceded by significant negative abnormal returns. The lack of preannouncement negative returns is interpreted as further evidence that the regulatory environment restricts firm's ability to use buybacks to take advantage of an undervalued stock. Table 6 reports a replication of RVs tests for our samples of SDC and Sequencer / FT intention announcements. 15 Following RV, we compute long-horizon abnormal returns with respect to a size-and price-to-book benchmark portfolio formed using the sequential sort procedure employed by Ikenberry et al. (1995) . All data are taken from
Datastream. We test the significance of these excess returns using the bootstrapping techniques applied by Ikenberry et al. (1995) .
Beginning with the results for the SDC sample reported in columns 2-5 of table 6, repurchase announcements are characterised by significant negative abnormal returns over the one-year preannouncement period. These results contrast with those reported by RV and suggest that repurchase announcements may indeed be driven by underpricing concerns. However, similar to RV we find no evidence of significant positive abnormal returns over the one-year postannouncement period. In addition, when the SDC sample is partitioned on the basis of tax regime, average postannouncement excess returns for repurchases announced in the pre-October 1996 period are significantly lower than those in the post-October 1996 period. These findings support RV's conclusion that repurchase announcements made prior to October 1996 were driven more by the desire to generate tax credits for pension funds than by the desire to exploit good investment opportunities.
In sum, therefore, while our SDC-based results are consistent with RV's tax hypothesis, they provide mixed evidence regarding the impact of regulation.
Columns 6-9 of table 6 report the results of the same analysis conducted using our sample of Sequencer / FT announcements. The findings differ in several important ways from those based on the SDC sample. First, the postannouncement excess returns are positive and significant for both the full sample and the post-October 1996 subsample. In addition, the negative preannouncement excess returns documented for the SDC sample are even more pronounced when the Sequencer / FT sample is used. Overall, the findings are consistent with extant U.S. evidence and as such suggest that repurchase announcements in the United Kingdom are indeed driven by underpricing considerations.
Secondly, the postannouncement excess returns for the pre-and post-October 1996 periods are not significantly different at conventional levels. Hence, the findings do not support the prediction that postannouncement excess returns were smaller in the agency buyback period because these repurchases were driven by tax (rather than undervaluation) considerations.
To summarize, the findings presented in table 6 reveal that RV's key long-run excess return results appear to be unique to the SDC sample. When the tests are replicated on a more comprehensive sample of repurchase announcements, the results do not support the claim that either regulatory restrictions in the United Kingdom have prevented firms from repurchasing shares to take advantage of an undervalued stock price, or that repurchase programs initiated before October 1996 were fundamentally different from those announced after the abolition of the agency buyback tax loophole.
V. Further Evidence on Share Repurchases and Underpricing
In this section we seek to shed further light on the links between U.K. share repurchases and underpricing by replicating the strategic trading tests reported by Dittmar (2000), Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
where XRet i,t is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for firm i in fiscal year t, XRet i,t-1 and XRet i;t+1 are the market-adjusted returns for firm i over the 12-month periods preceding and following fiscal year t, respectively, Size Rank and B/M Rank are the firm's size and book-to-market decile rank compared to all London Stock Exchangelisted firms as of year t, and %Bought i,t is the number of shares repurchased by firm i during fiscal year t, scaled by total shares outstanding at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Two versions of regression (1) are reported in table 7. In panel A, we estimate the model using all available years for all firms that purchased shares in at least one year during the period January 1995 to December 2000. Accordingly, %Bought takes the value of zero in firm-years when no shares are acquired, otherwise it is equal to the aggregate fraction of shares bought during fiscal year t. In panel B, we estimate regression (1) using only those firm-years where %Bought is non-zero (i.e., reacquisition years only). To avoid specification bias arising from the bounded nature of the dependent variable, regression
(1) is estimated after first applying a logit transformation to %Bought (Green 1990) .
Consistent with findings reported by Ikenberry et al. (2000) for Canada and
Dittmar (2000) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This paper re-examines findings relating to U.K. share repurchase activity reported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002) . Using a sample of repurchase announcements from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), RV conclude that share repurchases in the United Kingdom are relatively uncommon. They attribute the low levels of buyback activity to regulatory restrictions that limit managers' ability to repurchase shares when the firm is undervalued. Instead, the small amount repurchase activity that they document appears to be driven by a desire to generate tax credits for pension funds. claim that share repurchase activity in the United Kingdom is primarily driven by the desire to generate tax credits for pension funds appears to be an artefact of sampling biases in the SDC data. Specifically, while we replicate RV tax results using our SDC sample, these findings disappear when we use a more comprehensive sample of repurchase announcements. Finally, results using both the SDC and the expanded samples suggest in spite of the U.K. regulatory environment, share repurchase activity is still driven by a desire to exploit market mispricing: average announcement-period cumulative abnormal returns are consistent with those reported by extant U.S. studies; repurchase announcements are preceded by significantly negative 12-month excess returns and followed by significantly positive 12-month excess returns; and actual share reacquisitions are preceded by significantly negative excess returns.
Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that despite regulatory restrictions on the timing of buybacks, underpricing considerations still represent an important determinant of share repurchase activity in the United Kingdom, just as in the United States and Canada. The generalizability of this finding to a different institutional, legal and regulatory environment further emphasizes the robustness of the underpricing hypothesis, thereby refuting any suggestion that extant results are a consequence of idiosyncrasies in the U.S. tax and regulatory system.
Endnotes
1 While no tax credits were permitted on open market share repurchases, tax exempt shareholders were allowed to claim a tax credit of 25% on off-market repurchases (e.g., self-tender offers and private repurchases) as long as they could convince the tax authorities that they were not selling their shares simply in order to capture such credits. However, for practical purposes, this usually proved extremely difficult.
2 An agency buyback was an off-market repurchase in which shareholders sold their shares to a broker acting for the repurchasing company. Because the agent would contact key investors (e.g., pension funds) in advance and give them priority over other shareholder groups, the repurchase was effectively a private buyback directed at specific institutional clients. To outsiders, however, the transaction had the characteristics of an open market repurchase in the sense that all shareholders appeared able to participate. (Indeed, analysis of the data does not allow us to
distinguish between standard open market repurchases and agency buybacks). As a result, it was relatively easy for pension funds to convince the tax authorities that the transaction was not designed for tax purposes, thereby increasing the likelihood that the tax credit would be granted.
3 These data include self-tender and targeted repurchases in addition to open market buybacks.
However, because self-tender and targeted repurchases are relatively rare transactions in the United Kingdom, their inclusion is unlikely to explain the dramatically higher levels of buyback activity reported by Perrin (2000) . 4 Similarly, The Times (March 27 2000, p.23) asserts that buybacks are often used to boost flagging share prices. 5 Stephens and Weisbach (1998) study a sample of 450 open market share repurchase announcements made by US firms and find that approximately one quarter of all shares targeted at the time of the announcement remain unacquired at the end of the three-year postannouncement period. Ikenberry et al. (2000) report that over 95% of Canadian repurchase announcers fail to fully complete their buybacks programs, with approximately one quarter of announcers failing to make any repurchases.
6 Our sample window begins on January 1 1995 because this is the earliest date for which data from one of our alternative sources (the London Stock Exchange Regulatory News Service, supplied by Sequencer) is available.
7 RV use the term "repurchase completions" to describe these event dates. However, as they discuss (footnote 5: 261), this term is something of a misnomer since in many cases companies continue to repurchase shares after this date. Because SDC effective dates often represent general repurchase events, as opposed to specific program completions, we prefer the term "execution dates". announcements, yielding 88 repurchase intentions and 68 repurchase executions. 9 We compared actual reacquisition volume reported in firms' published financial statements with repurchase announcements for firms in the announcement sample. In many cases, total share reacquisitions reported in the financial statements exceeded the aggregate number of shares reported in all repurchase announcements during the corresponding fiscal year. 10 Ikenberry et al. (2000) identify and exploit similar reporting advantages in their study of Canadian repurchases.
11 The FT tends to focus on larger, higher profile stocks and as such may exclude repurchase announcements by smaller, less heavily tracked firms. Sequencer selectively deletes dead firms from its database and while the deletion criteria are not published, supplementary analysis suggests that smaller firms are more likely to be removed. 12 In untabulated tests, the average cumulative abnormal returns for such announcements were never significant. 13 We restrict our analysis to repurchase intentions because RV find no evidence of a significant market reaction to announcements of repurchase executions. To maintain comparability with RV, we retain all SDC announcements including those that either could not be verified by alternative sources or that appeared to refer to events other than repurchase intentions.
14 We are unable to explain why the mean CARs for our SDC sample appear to be substantially larger than CARs reported by RV for their SDC sample. One possibility that we considered is that our average CARs are being driven by announcements made after June 30 1998 (the end of RV's sample period). To assess the impact of the differing sample periods, we truncated our SDC sample at June 30 1998 and repeated our tests. The average CARs for this subset of announcements are even larger: 2.76% for the three-day window and 5.19% for the twenty-oneday window. Similar conclusions are obtained using alternative methods of estimating abnormal returns. 15 We restrict our tests to repurchase intentions because RVs key results are confined to these announcements.
27
16 Our evidence that stocks with recent price declines experience abnormal price rises in subsequent periods is consistent with results reported by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and Chopra et al. (1992) for the United States. By contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Brennan et al. (1998) find no evidence in support of such price reversals. where %Bought i,t is the number of shares repurchased by firm i in year t scaled by total shares outstanding at the beginning of the fiscal year, XRet i;t is the excess return for firm i in year t, XRet i;t-1 and XRet i;t+1 are the excess returns for firm i over the fiscal year preceding and following year t, respectively, and Size Rank and B/M Rank are the firm's size and book-to-market decile rank compared to all London Stock Exchangelisted firms as of year t.
Panel A: All firm-year observations
This panel reports coefficient estimates from the above regression estimated using all available years for all firms that purchased shares in at least one year during the period January 1995 to December 2000. %Bought takes the value of zero in firm-years where no shares were acquired, otherwise it is equal to the aggregate number of shares bought during fiscal year t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of year t. Excess returns are measured as the buy-and-hold return over the relevant 12-month accounting period for firm i minus the market return for the corresponding period. AB is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the repurchase occurred during the agency buyback period (January 1995 -October 1996 and zero otherwise. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. This panel reports coefficient estimates from the above regression estimated using only those firm-years where a repurchase was made during the period January 1995 to December 2000. %Bought is equal to the aggregate number of shares bought during fiscal year t scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of year t. Excess returns are measured as the buy-and-hold return over the relevant 12-month accounting period for firm i minus the market return for the corresponding period. AB is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the repurchase occurred during the agency buyback period (January 1995 -October 1996 and zero otherwise. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
